Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements by McEvoy, Dave & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
 
 
McEvoy, David and John K. Stranlund. (2010). Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental 
Agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 47(1): 45-63. Published by Springer 
www.springer.com (ISSN: 0924-6460). DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9364-7.  
 
 
 
 
 
Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements 
 
David M. McEvoy · John K. Stranlund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the consequences of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary 
agreements with industries to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry 
participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and 
regulatory approaches. A voluntary agreement can be more efficient in reaching an 
aggregate emissions target than a conventional emissions tax, but only if: (1) profitable 
voluntary agreements in which members of the agreement pay for its enforcement exist; 
(2) members of a voluntary agreement actually bear the costs of enforcing the 
agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by a third party, not the government, and (4) 
this third-party enforcer has a significant advantage in monitoring technology and/or 
available sanctions over the government. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary environmental 
agreements between regulators and polluting industries in place of standard regulatory 
approaches. Voluntary agreements are thought to have a number of advantages over 
traditional regulation. Firms may enjoy significant cost-savings from having increased 
flexibility in deciding how to meet an environmental target (Baggot 1986; Goodin 1986). 
Furthermore, voluntary agreements may require less time to implement relative to more 
traditional forms of regulation and may reduce conflicts between regulators and firms 
that often occur in this process (Segerson and Miceli 1998). Finally, some authors have 
suggested that voluntary agreements may be cheaper to enforce than traditional 
regulations (Bailey 1999; Schmelzer 1999; Nyborg 2000; Brouhle et al. 2005; Croci 
2005). While the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to 
environmental regulation has progressed quite far in the last decade, few studies have 
rigorously addressed the problem of enforcing voluntary environmental agreements. 
This paper examines the consequences of enforcement costs and who bears these 
costs on the ability of voluntary agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of 
voluntary participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary 
and an emissions tax. 
 
Voluntary environmental agreements are typically categorized as being one of three 
forms (Mazurek 1998; Carraro and Leveque 1999; Segerson and Li 1999; Alberini and 
Segerson 2002; Lyon and Maxwell 2002; Morgenstern and Pizer 2007).Unilateral 
agreements are environmental initiatives developed and implemented by firms or 
industries without any regulatory involvement. Public agreements are agreements in 
which a regulator sets the requirements and rewards of membership in a program and 
firms or industries voluntarily decide whether to participate. Under negotiated 
agreements, environmental targets are jointly agreed upon by a regulator and a firm, or 
between a regulator and industry association. In this paper we focus exclusively on a 
particular form of negotiated agreement in which a regulator commits to not impose a 
regulation on an industry (e.g., an emissions tax) if it can voluntarily meet the regulator’s 
environmental target. This is the most common voluntary approach in Europe (Borkey 
and Leveque 2000; Conrad 2001). Examples include the Netherland’s Environmental 
Plan for limiting carbon emissions (i.e., the “Dutch Covenants”), France’s agreement on 
the treatment of end-of-life vehicles, and the United Kingdom’s Climate Change 
Agreements. 
 
Compliance with negotiated agreements, like more traditional forms of regulation, must 
be enforced. This is particularly true when firms’ emissions are not easily observed and 
the government’s decision to allow a voluntary agreement is not easily reversed. In 
these cases a firm may be motivated to join an agreement to help prevent the 
imposition of some conventional regulation, but then decide not to reduce its emissions 
to the extent required under the agreement. If this occurs, then the environmental goals 
of the agreement will not be achieved. 
 
Consequently, existing agreements include both monitoring and sanctioning 
components. Moreover, there is substantial variation in how these agreements are 
enforced. Some agreements focus on the compliance of individual firms.Monitoring in 
these agreements may rely on firms submitting self-reports of their emissions or other 
activities to a third-party or branch association as under the United Kingdom’s Climate 
Change Agreements (Bailey and Rupp 2006), the Netherland’s covenants for reducing 
carbon emissions (Ministry of Economic Affairs 1999), and Chilean agreements on 
chemical emissions (Jimenez 2007). Given infor mation in self-reports, on-site audits 
can be conducted by regulators in the UK’s Climate Change Agreements or delegated 
to the firms themselves through a branch association as in the Chilean agreements. 
Sanctions for individual firm’s noncompliance take the form of restrictions on operating 
licenses under the Dutch covenants, loss of a tax credit in the UK Climate Change 
Agreements, or a fine from a branch association or other government sanctions in the 
Chilean case. Other agreements rely on collective monitoring of targets and collective 
sanctions in cases of industry-wide noncompliance. For example, the German 
agreement on Global Warming Prevention requires its members, who are major industry 
associations, to reduce CO2 emissions in exchange for the government’s promise to not 
impose an energy tax. If a member industry is in violation, the government can respond 
by issuing new regulation, which could include a tax or more traditional command-and-
control measures (Borkey and Leveque 2000; Delmas and Terlaak 2002). 
 
Most theoretical analyses of negotiated agreements model simple agreements between 
a government and a single firm, or a series of independent agreements with an arbitrary 
number of firms (Segerson andMiceli 1998, 1999; Schmelzer 1999; Nyborg 2000; Lyon 
and Maxwell 2003; Glachant 2007).3 As a result these studies preclude the possibility of 
free riding, which is a thought to be an important characteristic of existing voluntary 
agreements (Storey et al. 1999; Alberini and Segerson 2002). Dawson and Segerson 
(2008) study the free-riding issue by modeling voluntary participation with an 
environmental agreement in which a regulator offers an industry the opportunity to meet 
an aggregate emissions target in exchange for not imposing an emissions tax. They 
demonstrate that voluntary agreements can always form to meet environmental quality 
goals, but they will typically involve less than full participation of the firms in an industry. 
Because some firms free ride on the emissions control of others, voluntary agreements 
will not distribute emission control responsibilities efficiently; hence, voluntary 
agreements can never be as efficient as emissions taxes. 
 
Dawson and Segerson (2008), like most of the literature on voluntary agreements with 
industries, assume that firms that join an agreement comply with its terms without the 
need for enforcement. We extend their analysis of the formation and performance of 
voluntary agreements with industries by adding the missing enforcement component. 4 
This is an important extension because several authors have speculated that voluntary 
agreements may have an advantage over conventional regulation in terms of 
enforcement. For example, Bailey (1999) suggests that voluntary approaches maybe 
cheaper to enforce, because only the subset of firms that join a voluntary agreement 
need to be monitored. Others predict a cost savings because of expected advantages 
an industry-led enforcement scheme has over government enforcement (Schmelzer 
1999). For example, it is possible that an enforcer of a voluntary agreement has better 
information than the government about firms’ incentives and could therefore monitor 
their compliance behavior more effectively. Additionally, industry-led enforcement may 
be capable of imposing higher penalties for noncompliance (Nyborg 2000). 
 
Our approach to modeling enforcement of voluntary agreements is as follows: We’ve 
just noted that there is substantial variation in how existing voluntary agreements are 
enforced. Since we do not focus our work on the choice of enforcement method for 
voluntary agreements, although we think this may be an important issue for future 
research, we have chosen to model enforcement of these agreements in a way that is 
close to what is typically assumed about enforcing an emissions tax. That is, the 
emissions of individual members of a voluntary agreement are monitored with some 
endogenous probability and violations are sanctioned with a financial penalty that is 
proportional to the size of the violation. This allows for a straightforward comparison of 
the performance of voluntary agreements with that of an emissions tax, without getting 
tangled up in differences in enforcement methods. 
 
A unique feature of our work is that we address the question of who should enforce 
voluntary agreements, the government or some third-party, and who should bear the 
costs of enforcement, the government or the members of the agreement. One does not 
need to assume that enforcement is unnecessary to obtain Dawson and Segerson’s 
results; they can be obtained under the assumption that an unspecified enforcement 
method achieves the full compliance of an agreement’s members, but these firms do 
not bear any of the enforcement costs. For comparison, we construct a model in which 
the members of a voluntary agreement finance and empower a third-party (perhaps a 
branch association) to enforce the agreement. 
 
Our efforts yield several new insights. First, we demonstrate that enforcement costs that 
are borne by the members of an agreement limit the circumstances under which 
voluntary emissions control agreements can form in place of an emissions tax. In fact, 
agreements with member-financed enforcement will not form when the enforcer of the 
agreement possesses a weak monitoring technology, the available sanction for 
noncompliance is too low, or when the aggregate emissions control target to be 
achieved is too stringent. However, when an agreement with member-financed 
enforcement forms it will have more members than if members of the agreement did not 
have to bear the costs of enforcement. Thus, making agreement members bear the 
costs of enforcement reduces free riding on the agreement. Finally, we show that a 
voluntary agreement can be an efficient alternative to reaching an aggregate emissions 
target with a tax, but four conditions must be met: (1) profitable voluntary agreements 
with member-financed enforcement must exist; (2) members of a voluntary agreement 
bear the costs of enforcing the agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by a third-
party, not the government, and (4) this third-party enforcer has a significant advantage 
over the government in its monitoring technology and/or available sanctions. 
 
 
 
2 Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries 
2.1 Fundamentals 
 
Like Dawson and Segerson (2008) we consider an industry of n identical firms that emit 
a uniformly mixed pollutant. Each firm possesses a strictly concave profit function 
 
(1)     
where β, b and b__ are positive constants and e denotes the emissions of each firm. 
We specify the form of the profit function to ease our computations in later sections of 
the paper. Absent an incentive to control its emissions, the firm chooses its emissions 
so that π _ (e) = 0, Yielding 
 
(2)     
 
(The superscript u identifies uncontrolled emissions). The firm’s profit at this emissions 
level is 
 
(3)     
 
Suppose that the government seeks to reduce industry emissions by charging a per unit 
emissions tax t. Assuming full compliance under the tax, each firm chooses its 
emissions to maximize , resulting in individual 
emissions 
 
(4)     
 
Throughout the analysis we consider taxes such that 0 < t < b. These restrictions focus 
the analysis on situations in which the government wishes to reduce the industry’s 
emissions, but not all the way to zero. Substituting (4) into (1) gives us each firm’s gross 
profit under the tax: 
 
(5)     
 
Subtracting the tax payment from (5) yields each firm’s net profit: 
 
(6)     
 
An emissions tax will lead to the distribution of emission control in the industry that 
maximizes industry profit, given that aggregate emissions are limited to ne(t) = n(b − 
t)/b^n. However, suppose the government is willing not to impose the emissions tax if 
the industry can reach ne(t) through a voluntary emissions control agreement. Dawson 
and Segerson (2008) model such an agreement. In their model member firms commit to 
emissions standards that satisfy the government’s target, taking into account the 
emissions choices of the nonmember firms. In response, the government does not 
impose the emissions tax. The main results of Dawson and Segerson (2008) are that an 
aggregate emission target can always be achieved with a voluntary agreement, but 
such an agreement will generally involve only a subset of firms who control their 
emissions while the remaining firms do not. Consequently, voluntary emissions control 
agreements with industries can meet regulatory objectives, but they will not distribute 
individual emissions control efficiently.  
 
Although Dawson and Segerson assumed away problems of enforcing voluntary 
agreements, one way to think about enforcement in their model is that the government 
only measures aggregate emissions (and does so perfectly), and if its target is 
exceeded it simply imposes the emissions tax on all firms. All members of an 
agreement would comply because each of them knows that if they fail to meet their 
individual emissions standard, the aggregate target will not be achieved, the regulator 
will observe this, and it will impose the emissions tax. 
 
In more realistic cases it will not be easy to monitor aggregate emissions from an 
industry without monitoring individual firms.Moreover, a government’s decision to allow 
a voluntary agreement in place of a tax may not be easy to reverse. This could be 
because implementing an emissions control policy (whether a conventional regulation or 
a voluntary agreement) is so time consuming and costly that it is hard for the 
government to reverse itself. (Glachant (2007) discusses the difficulties of enacting new 
legislation). The combination of hard-to-reverse regulatory decisions and hard-to-
observe aggregate emissions implies that in many cases it will not be possible to 
enforce a voluntary agreement by threatening to impose a tax in case of aggregate 
noncompliance. 
 
Therefore, we assume that a regulator’s decision to allow a voluntary agreement or to 
impose a tax cannot be reversed, and that determining compliance with an agreement 
is based on imperfect and costly measures of member firms’ emissions. Moreover, 
sanctions for noncompliance are financial penalties that are linear in the size of a 
member firms’ violation. 
 
Another way to think about enforcement in Dawson and Segerson’s model is that their 
results obtain under the assumption that the government bears the costs of enforcing an 
agreement and enforcement is successful in making sure that all member firms are 
compliant. It turns out that who bears the responsibility for enforcing a voluntary 
agreement and who bears the enforcement costs have a significant impact on the 
performance of voluntary agreements. This variation requires that we present a model 
of the formation of a voluntary emissions control agreement in which members of a 
voluntary agreement finance a third-party enforcer to monitor their compliance behavior 
and to apply sanctions in cases of noncompliance. 
 
 
 
2.2 Voluntary Agreements with Member-Financed Enforcement 
 
Participation and compliance with a voluntary agreement is modeled in four stages. In 
the first stage (membership stage) firms freely choose whether they will become a 
member of an agreement. In stage two (agreement stage), member firms jointly agree 
on whether to reduce their emissions to a standard that meets the government’s 
aggregate target, given the emissions of the nonmember firms. If the members agree to 
meet the target, each of them contributes funds to the enforcer to maintain their 
compliance with the emissions standard. If this occurs, the government does not impose 
the emissions tax. If the agreement members jointly decide not to meet the 
government’s target in stage two (or cannot because of low participation), they do not 
fund the enforcer, an effective agreement does not form, and the government imposes 
the emissions tax. (Throughout, we refer to an effective voluntary agreement as one 
that actually leads to voluntary achievement of the aggregate emissions target in place 
of an emissions tax). If an agreement forms in stage two, both members and 
nonmembers independently choose their emissions in stage three (emissions stage). 
Finally, in the fourth stage (enforcement stage) the enforcer of the agreement randomly 
audits the emissions of member firms with the funding provided to it in the second 
stage, and applies a sanction when a violation is discovered. Because the game is 
solved by backward induction, we start with the last stage. 
 
2.2.1 Enforcement Stage 
 
Let s denote the number of members of a voluntary agreement. To ease the exposition 
and later calculations, we assume that the number of firms is large enough so that s can 
be treated as a continuous variable. If the game reaches this stage a voluntary 
agreement with s members has formed, they have agreed to reduce their emissions to 
meet the government’s target, each of them has made a contribution to fund the 
enforcer, and all firms have chosen their emissions. In the enforcement stage, the third-
party enforcer randomly audits the emissions of the agreement members and applies a 
sanction in cases of noncompliance. 
 
Monitoring by the enforcer consists of a ≤ s random audits of the agreement members. 
An audit of a firm reveals its emissions without error. If each member of the agreement 
contributes x to the enforcer, it can audit a = αsx members, where α is interpreted as the 
constant marginal productivity of enforcement resources in producing audits. Since 
audits are random, the probability that any one firm will be audited is 
 
(7)     
 
Note that given a fixed contribution by each member of the agreement, increasing the 
number of members does not change the audit probability because each additional 
member contributes enough to keep that probability constant. However, we will see 
shortly that the contribution of each member, and hence the audit probability, will 
depend on the number of members. Moreover, we will demonstrate exactly what is 
required to make ρ ∈ (0, 1]. 
 
A member of a voluntary agreement is noncompliant when its emissions exceed the 
standard required under the agreement. Let em(s) denote the emissions standard for 
each member of an agreement with s members. The exact standard will be specified 
shortly. If the enforcer finds a violator it imposes a unit fine of f on e − em(s) > 0. Note 
that each firm faces the expected marginal penalty ρ f = αx f. The fine is constrained to 
be no more than an exogenous value f. 
 
2.2.2 Emissions Stage 
 
At this point in the game the members of a voluntary agreement have agreed to reduce 
their emissions to meet the government’s target and have funded the enforcer. In the 
emissions stage both the agreement members and nonmembers independently choose 
their emissions. Nonmembers have no incentive to control their emissions, so they each 
choose their uncontrolled levels eu specified by (2). Member firms, however, hold their 
emissions to em(s) if and only if the agreement is enforced adequately. To simplify the 
analysis, we restrict ourselves to enforcement strategies that guarantee full compliance 
by the members of the agreement. 
 
Assume that the firms are risk neutral and that members of an agreement comply with 
its emissions standard if they are at least indifferent between compliance and 
noncompliance. Each of them chooses their emissions to maximize their expected net 
profit; that is, they solve maxe π(e) − ρ f (e − em(s)), subject to e ≥ em(s) where π(e) is 
specified in (1). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution to this problem are π _ 
(e) − ρ f ≤ 0, e − em(s) ≥ 0, and [π _ (e)−ρ f ][e−em(s)] = 0. These conditions indicate that 
all parties will comply with the standard as long as 
 
(8)     
 
Thus a firm will comply as long as the expected marginal penalty for violating the 
standard is not less than its marginal profit evaluated at the standard. This guarantees 
that a firm’s marginal benefit from noncompliance—π’ (e) for e ≥ em(s)—is never 
greater than the expected marginal penalty. In the previous stage of the game, the 
agreement stage, the members of an agreement will provide sufficient funds to the 
enforcer to guarantee that (8) holds. 
 
2.2.3 Agreement Stage 
 
The firms that agree to join a voluntary emissions control agreement in the first stage 
agree to reduce their emissions to meet the government’s target and fund the enforcer 
of the agreement stage as long as these decisions maximize their joint profits. Firms 
cannot credibly commit to reducing their emissions in this stage because their 
emissions are only revealed later if they are audited. In the agreement stage firms only 
state that they will reduce their emissions in the emissions (third) stage. On the other 
hand the individual payments to the enforcer are easily observed. To preclude the 
possibility that a firm can agree to make this payment and then fail to do so, we require 
that the payment be made in this stage if an effective agreement forms. 
 
With s member firms, each of which emit em(s), and n − s nonmembers each of which 
emit eu, the government’s aggregate emissions target is achieved if and only if sem(s) + 
(n −s)eu ≤ ne(t). The uniform emissions standard required of each member of a 
voluntary agreement is determined by substituting e(t) = (b − t)/b__ and eu = b/b__ from 
(4) and (2) into sem(s) + (n − s)eu = ne(t) and solving for em(s):  
 
(9)     
 
Note that em(s) ≥ 0 if and only if s ≥ nt/b. Therefore, voluntary agreements with 
participation levels in the interval [nt/b, n] can meet the government’s target, but 
agreements with less than nt/b members cannot, even if each of them reduced their 
emissions to zero. Given s ≥ nt/b, note that em(s) is increasing in s, but is decreasing in 
t. More members implies that the burden of holding industry emissions to ne(t) is 
distributed among more firms. On the other hand, a higher emissions tax implies that 
the government is trying to induce a lower aggregate standard. Thus, given a fixed 
membership in a voluntary agreement, each member of the agreement must reduce its 
emissions further to achieve the government’s goal. 
 
To determine the payment each member of an effective voluntary agreement makes to 
the enforcer, note that agreement members will contribute just enough to the enforcer 
so that it can maintain compliance with minimum monitoring costs. From (8) this 
requires ρ f = π’ (em(s)), yielding the audit probability ρ = π ‘ (em(s))/ f . Use (1) and (9) 
to calculate π’ (em(s)) and substitute the result into ρ = π’(em(s))/ f to obtain ρ = nt/s f. 
Since this is decreasing in the fine, the agreement members will all agree that the fine 
should be as high as possible; that is, f = f. Therefore, minimal monitoring to maintain 
compliance requires 
 
(10)     
 
Since we must have ρ ≤ 1, it is clear that s ≥ nt/ f is a necessary condition for an 
effective voluntary agreement. If this condition did not hold, then the enforcer would not 
be able to maintain compliance with the agreement, even if it audited each of its 
members. Note that the combination of a low sanction and lack of participation can 
prevent the formation of a voluntary agreement. For the remainder of this analysis we 
assume that nt ≤ s f￣ to allow an effective agreement to form. Given that an agreement 
forms, the payment each member of the agreement makes to the enforcer is 
determined by combining (10) and (7) to obtain 
 
(11)     
 
Not surprisingly, ρ and xm(s) are decreasing in the fine and the productivity of 
monitoring resources. More interestingly, they are also decreasing in the number of 
members of the agreement. That π’(em(s)) is decreasing in s tells us that an individual 
member’s incentive to violate the agreement’s standard is reduced as the number of 
members is increased. Consequently, the minimum audit probability that is necessary to 
maintain full compliance and the payment each member makes to the enforcer can be 
reduced. On the other hand, an increase in the threatened tax implies that the 
government’s aggregate target is lower and members of the agreement must reduce 
their emissions further. Since firms have a greater incentive to violate a lower standard, 
the audit probability required to maintain their compliance and the payment they make 
to the enforcer must increase as the emissions tax is increased.  
 
2.2.4 Membership Stage 
 
Members of a voluntary agreement will agree to an emissions standard to meet the 
government’s target and to fund the enforcer if and only if they are at least as well off as 
under the emission tax; that is, the agreement must be profitable for each of its 
members. We explore the profitability of voluntary agreements with member-financed 
enforcement shortly; for now, let us just say that profitability depends on the number of 
firms that join the agreement in the first stage of the game (the membership stage). If a 
sufficient number of firms join in the first stage, they will agree to an emissions standard 
to meet the government’s target and fund the enforcer in the second. In response, the 
government does not impose the emissions tax. Since funds for the enforcer are 
sufficient to guarantee full compliance, in the third stage each member complies with 
the standard. In the fourth stage the enforcer conducts random audits of the members’ 
emissions, but finds no violations. On the other hand, if too few firms join the agreement 
in the first stage, the agreement will not be profitable. The members then do not agree 
to control their emissions, there is no need to fund the enforcer, and the government 
imposes the tax on all firms. 
 
Having laid out all the elements of a voluntary agreement with member-financed 
enforcement, we now turn to determining the equilibrium of the game. 
 
3 Equilibrium Voluntary Environmental Agreements 
 
Recall that an effective voluntary agreement is one that leads to voluntary achievement 
of the aggregate emissions target in place of an emissions tax. To determine the 
equilibrium number of members of an effective agreement, like Dawson and Segerson, 
we adopt the concept of a self-enforcing agreement that has been used in the study of 
cartels (D’Aspremont et al. 1983), and international environmental agreements (Barrett 
1994; Kolstad 2007). For an agreement to be self-enforcing, it must satisfy three 
conditions: (1) it must be profitable in the sense that each member of the agreement is 
at least as well off in the agreement as under the emissions tax; (2) it must be internally 
stable in the sense that no member of an agreement is motivated to leave it, and (3) it 
must be externally stable in the sense that no nonmember wishes to join a voluntary 
agreement. We begin by examining the profitability requirement of voluntary 
agreements that require member-financed enforcement. 
 
3.1 Profitable Voluntary Agreements with Member-Financed Enforcement 
 
From Sect. 2.2.3, recall that the members of an agreement cannot meet the regulator’s 
emissions target if s < nt/b. Moreover, recall from (10) and the discussion that followed 
that the enforcer of an agreement would not be able to maintain compliance with the 
agreement if s < nt/ f￣. Thus, an effective voluntary agreement cannot form if s < max 
(nt / b, nt / f).  To focus on situations in which an effective agreement with member-
financed enforcement can actually form, we limit our analysis to agreements such that 
. 
 
Let  denote the profit of each member of an agreement. (The superscript c 
indicates profit for members of an agreement when they bear the costs of enforcing it). 
To compare outcomes with and without member-financed enforcement, let  
denote the profit of each member of an agreement that does not require member-
financed enforcement. (The superscript nc indicates profit levels for firms in voluntary 
agreements that do not require member-financed enforcement). The following lemma 
specifies  and states some of its characteristics. It is proved in the appendix. 
 
Lemma 1 For s ∈ [max (nt/b, nt/ f￣) , n], the profit for each firm in a voluntary emissions 
control agreement that requires member-financed enforcement is 
 
(12)   
 
with the following characteristics: 
 
 
 
For a given s, (12) indicates that the difference between the profit of the members of an 
agreement that does not require member-financed enforcement and the profit of the 
members of an agreement with member-financed enforcement is simply the payment 
the members of the latter form of agreement pay to fund its enforcer, xm(s). Part (i) of 
the lemma indicates that the profit of each member of an agreement with and without 
member-financed enforcement is increasing in the number of members. Parts (ii) and 
(iii) are more interesting because they reveal when profitable agreements exist. Part (ii) 
is a restatement of Dawson and Segerson’s result that profitable voluntary agreements 
without member-financed enforcement always exist. (This result follows from the 
assumption that b > t). However, part (iii) indicates that profitable agreements with 
member-financed enforcement exist only if (b − t) ≥ . There is nothing in the model 
with member-financed enforcement that requires or implies this condition. Since only 
profitable agreements can form in place of an emissions tax, we have our first 
conclusion about the impact of member-financed enforcement on voluntary emissions 
control agreements. 
 
Proposition 1 Profitable voluntary agreements with member-financed enforcement 
exist if and only if (b − t) ≥ . Thus, the circumstances under which an effective 
voluntary agreement can form are diminished by enforcement costs that are borne by 
the members of an agreement. 
 
That (b−t) ≥ is required for an effective agreement reveals how member-financed 
agreements can fail to form. Somewhat loosely, the likelihood that an agreement can 
form is reduced as the marginal productivity of monitoring resources α, or the size of the 
maximum available sanction f￣, are reduced. Reducing either of these parameters 
increases the payment to the enforcer required of all agreement members, which leads 
to a decrease in the set of opportunities for an effective agreement. Moreover, the 
likelihood that an agreement can form falls as the threatened emissions tax is 
increased. Since the government’s aggregate emission target is decreasing in t, 
voluntary agreements with member-financed enforcement can fail to form if the 
government’s aggregate environmental target is too stringent. 
 
3.2 A Self-Enforcing Voluntary Agreement that Requires Member-Financed 
Enforcement 
 
It is well-known that the minimum size profitable coalition is critical in determining the 
self-enforcing number of participants with a voluntary agreement. When profitable 
agreements with member-financed enforcement exist the smallest profitable coalition is: 
 
(13)  
 
Let sc be the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing voluntary emission 
control agreement that requires member-financed enforcement. The definition of a self-
enforcing voluntary agreement in this setting is: 
 
Definition Suppose that (b − t) ≥ so that profitable voluntary agreements with 
member-financed enforcement exist. An agreement with s^c > 0 firms is self-enforcing if 
and only if: 
 
(14)  
 
Requirement (i) of a self-enforcing voluntary agreement is the internal stability condition 
that no member of the agreement has an incentive to leave the agreement, while 
requirement (ii) is the external stability condition that no nonmember wishes to join the 
agreement. The only internally and externally stable coalition size is the smallest 
profitable coalition, provided that a profitable coalition actually exists. Therefore, we 
have: 
 
Proposition 2 A self-enforcing voluntary emissions control agreement with member-
financed enforcement has sc = sc min members provided that (b − t) ≥ . If (b − t) < 
, then a voluntary agreement will not form and the government will impose the 
emissions tax. 
 
It is easy to show why this proposition holds, so we do not offer a formal proof. A self-
enforcing agreement always exists as long as profitable agreements exist. In Fig. 1 we 
have graphed a candidate for πcm(s) that allows an agreement with member-financed 
enforcement to form.9 Figure 1 clearly illustrates that all coalitions involving 
memberships greater than or equal to sc min are profitable. To see why the only self-
enforcing number of members of a voluntary agreement is sc min, note first that if sc > 
sc min, then at least one member of sc could leave the agreement to earn the free-
riding payoff, , without having the agreement collapse. Thus, no coalitions 
with more than sc min members are internally stable. However, a coalition with exactly 
sc min members is internally stable, because one fewer member would leave the 
remaining members worse off than under the emissions tax. They would then refuse to 
control their emissions voluntarily and the tax would be imposed on all firms. Finally, an 
agreement with sc = sc min members is externally stable: no nonmember would join this 
agreement because they earn more by free riding. 
 
If the members of a voluntary agreement do not bear the costs of enforcing the 
agreement, (11) and (12) indicate that they each earn profit of 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Individual profit under voluntary agreements with and without member-
financed enforcement and the equilibrium number of members 
 
This is also graphed in Fig. 1. It is always above , because 
from Lemma 1. Moreover, recall that part (ii) of Lemma 1 guarantees that profitable 
agreements always exist when members do not bear the enforcement costs. Let snc 
denote the equilibrium number of members to an agreement that does not require 
member-financed enforcement. This is the equilibrium of Dawson and Segerson. As 
always the equilibrium number of members of a voluntary agreement is the smallest 
profitable coalition, which is s such that  . Using (6) to solve this 
equation for s yields 
 
(15)     
 
as the equilibrium coalition size when the coalition members do not bear the 
enforcement costs. 
 
It is clear from Fig. 1 that sc > snc. More formally, subtract (15) from (13) to obtain: 
 
(16)   
 
To sign this expression note that it is increasing in b__ and is equal to zero when b^n = 
0. Since we assume b^n > 0, s^c – s^nc > 0. This proves our next proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 If an effective voluntary emission control agreement with member-
financed enforcement forms, the number of members of the agreement will be greater 
than under a voluntary agreement that does not require member-financed enforcement. 
 
The reason for this result is straightforward. Since contributing to the enforcement of a 
voluntary agreement is an additional cost of joining one, more firms are required to 
participate to make the agreement profitable. 
 
When a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement forms the number of 
free riders on the agreement will be less than if the agreement members did not bear 
enforcement costs. Recall that Dawson and Segerson (2008) showed that free riding 
makes voluntary agreements inefficient in the sense that aggregate industry profit at the 
government’s aggregate emissions target is not maximized. Since free riding is reduced 
when agreement members finance their own enforcement, the inefficiency associated 
with free riding is also less.  
 
But how does having agreement members finance enforcement change total 
enforcement costs? It turns out that the total costs of enforcing an effective agreement 
with member-financed enforcement are exactly the same as the costs of enforcing an 
agreement without member-financed enforcement, even though the size of the 
agreements are different. To see this suppose that the entity that enforces the 
agreement has a monitoring parameter α and a sanction f￣. Then, (11) gives us the 
per-firm cost of enforcing the emissions standard of an agreement with s members, and 
total enforcement costs are . That this is independent of s tells us that 
the total enforcement costs of an agreement with member-financed enforcement are the 
same as if the agreement members did not finance its enforcement. There are two 
equal but opposing forces at work here. An agreement with member-financed 
enforcement has more members, which increases the costs of enforcement. However, 
more members means that the individual emissions standard is higher, which reduces 
enforcement costs because firms have a lower incentive to violation a less stringent 
standard. In our model these effects exactly offset each other. 
 
Since having agreement members incur enforcement costs reduces free-riding loss, but 
does not change total enforcement costs for a particular monitoring technology and 
sanction, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 Given a monitoring technology and sanction applied to a voluntary 
agreement, if an effective agreement with member-financed enforcement forms, it will 
be more efficient than if agreement members did not bear the costs of enforcement. 
 
Our results thus far reveal the importance of having the members of an agreement 
finance its enforcement: if an effective voluntary agreement with member-financed 
enforcement can form, it will be more efficient than an agreement that has some other 
entity (like the government) bear its enforcement costs. The question now becomes, is it 
ever possible for a voluntary agreement to be more efficient than an emissions tax? 
Absent a consideration of enforcement costs, this is not possible as Dawson and 
Segerson show. However, in the next section we show that considering enforcement 
costs yields a limited set of circumstances under which a voluntary agreement can be 
an efficient alternative to an emissions tax. 
 
4 Enforcement Costs and the Relative Efficiency of Voluntary Environmental 
Agreements 
4.1 The Cost of Enforcing an Emissions Tax 
 
To compare the efficiency of a voluntary agreement and an emissions tax, we first need 
to derive the cost of enforcing a tax. Under a tax each firm in the industry is required to 
submit a report of its emissions r, and it is noncompliant if it attempts to evade some 
part of its tax liability by reporting r < e. After the firms release their emissions and 
submit their emission reports the government randomly audits the emissions of some 
subset of the firms so that the probability that any one of them is audited is ρg. (The 
superscript g identifies parameters and variables associated with the government’s 
enforcement capabilities. In general, these will be different from those of a third-party 
enforcer of a voluntary agreement). If a firm is audited and their reported emissions are 
lower than their actual emissions, the firm is fined  per unit of e − r > 0. As with 
the enforcement of a voluntary agreement, we assume that the government enforces 
the emissions tax so that all firms are compliant. 
 
Assuming for simplicity that firms always choose positive emissions, a risk neutral firm 
chooses its actual and reported emissions to maximize 
 
(17)     
 
The constraint e − r ≥ 0 is imposed because a firm will never have an incentive to over-
report its emissions. Let L denote the Lagrange equation for (17) and let λ denote the 
multiplier attached to the constraint e − r ≥ 0. Then, the following first-order conditions 
are both necessary and sufficient to determine the firm’s choices of emissions and 
emissions report: 
 
(18)        
(19)     
(20)     
 
Under the assumption that a firm will comply if it is indifferent between compliance and 
noncompliance, (19) and (20) reveal that inducing truthful reporting requires that the tax 
not exceed the expected marginal penalty for under-reported emissions; that is, t ≤ ρ^g 
f^ g. If the inequality was reversed, the firm would report zero emissions because it 
would be cheaper to face the expected penalty than to pay the tax. Moreover, to 
minimize the monitoring cost of inducing full compliance the government sets the fine at 
its maximum level, f g = f￣g, and monitors so that t = ρ^g f￣^g.11 Finally, since r = e > 
0, (19) becomes Lr = 0. Then, combining (18) and (19) yields π _ (e) = t. Using a firm’s 
profit function, π(e) defined by (1), each firm’s gross profit under the tax is defined by (5) 
and its profit net of its tax payment is defined by (6). 
In enforcing the emission tax the government has the same sort of linear monitoring 
technology as the third-party enforcer of an alternative voluntary agreement with 
member-financed enforcement. Let x(t) denote the per-firm amount of money the 
government spends on auditing firms under the tax. If the marginal productivity of 
monitoring resources is the constant αg, then the audit probability each firm faces is 
. Moreover, since the government audits just enough firms so 
that t = ρ^g f￣^g, the per-firm cost of enforcing the emissions tax is x(t) = t/α^g f￣^g, 
and aggregate enforcement costs are 
 
(21)     
 
4.2 Can a Voluntary Emissions Control Agreement be More Efficient than an 
Emissions Tax? 
 
Our welfare measure under the emissions tax is aggregate gross industry profit less the 
aggregate costs of enforcement, V t = nπ(e(t)) − nx(t). Note that we are assuming that 
tax revenue is a simple transfer with no real effects. Aggregate welfare under the 
voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement is industry profit, V c = πcm 
(sc)sc+π(eu)(n−sc). Recall from (12) that  includes the payment a member of a 
voluntary agreement makes to the enforcer of the agreement; hence, V c includes the 
total costs of enforcing an agreement. The difference between welfare under the 
emissions tax and the voluntary agreement is 
. Upon substitution of π(e(t)) from (5), nx(t) from (21), sc 
from Proposition 2,  from (12), and π(e^u) from (3), we have: 
 
(22)     
 
Note that the second and third terms of (22) capture the difference between the costs of 
enforcing the voluntary agreement and the costs of enforcing the emissions tax (see 
(11) and (21)). The first term, which is non-negative because n ≥ s^c, is the gain in 
aggregate gross profit of the industry under the emissions tax over the voluntary 
agreement because there is no free-riding loss under the emission tax. Equation (22) 
reveals clearly that V^t > V^c if α f￣ = α^g f￣^g and n > s^c. Just as clearly, if the 
government has the enforcement advantage so that α f￣ < α^g f￣^g, then a voluntary 
agreement with member-financed enforcement will never be more efficient than an 
emissions tax. However, our next proposition reveals that if an agreement with member-
financed enforcement can form, it is always possible that the third-party enforcer of the 
agreement has enough of an advantage over the government to make a voluntary 
agreement more efficient than an emissions tax. Proposition 5 is proved in the 
appendix. 
 
Proposition 5 An effective voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement is 
more efficient than an emissions tax if and only if α^g f￣^g < (α^g f￣^g)^0, where (α^g 
f￣^g)^0 is the unique solution to V t = Vc and is strictly positive and strictly less than α 
f. 
 
Our conclusion that it is always possible that a voluntary agreement is more efficient 
than an emissions tax comes from the fact that the cut-off value in Proposition 5, _αg f 
g_0, is strictly greater than zero. In the proof of the proposition we show that V^t – V^c 
is monotonically increasing in αg f￣^g, and V^t > V^c when α f￣ = αg f￣^g. Therefore, 
there is a value of αg f￣^g at which V^t = V^c, which is _αg f￣g_0. If this value was 
negative, then we would have V^t > V^c for all positive values of αg f￣g, and a 
voluntary agreement could never outperform an emissions tax. That it is positive implies 
that there is a range of positive values of αg f￣^g for which a voluntary agreement is 
more efficient than an emissions tax. That values in this range are strictly less than α f￣ 
indicates that a voluntary agreement can only be more efficient than an emission tax 
when the enforcer of the agreement has a significant advantage over the government in 
its monitoring capability and/or available sanction. 
 
Of course, another possibility for the design of a voluntary agreement is for the 
government to do the enforcement. If the government enforces a voluntary agreement, 
then either it bears the enforcement costs or it recovers the costs from the members of 
the agreement. In the former case the number of members of the agreement is snc 
(defined by (15)) and in the latter case the number of members is sc (defined by (13) 
and Proposition 2) with α f￣ replaced by αg f￣g. From (11), if the government enforces 
a voluntary agreement with s members, the per-member firm cost of enforcement is 
. We have demonstrated that total enforcement costs of voluntary 
agreements with and without member-financed enforcement are the same, provided 
that the enforcement technologies are the same. Therefore, the total costs of the 
government enforcing a voluntary agreement when it covers these costs and when it 
charges the agreement members are . Compare this 
to (21) to note that the total costs of enforcing the emissions tax is equal to 
and  as well. Our following proposition follows directly from the fact that there is 
a freeriding loss with voluntary agreements and the government cannot conserve 
enforcement costs by allowing a voluntary agreement that it enforces. 
 
Proposition 6 It is always more efficient for the government to impose the emissions 
tax than to allow a voluntary agreement that it enforces. 
 
We now have all the ingredients necessary to prove our final proposition, which reveals 
that voluntary emissions control agreements can be an efficient alternative to an 
emissions tax, but only under a fairly limited set of circumstances. 
 
Proposition 7 A voluntary agreement is an efficient alternative to reaching an 
aggregate emissions target with an emissions tax if and only if: (1) profitable 
agreements with member-financed enforcement exist; (2) members of a voluntary 
agreement bear the costs of enforcing the agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by 
a third-party, not the government, and (4) this third-party enforcer has a significant 
advantage in monitoring technology and/or available sanctions over the government. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Our efforts have provided several new results that have significant relevance for our 
understanding of the efficacy and efficiency of voluntary emissions control agreements. 
Our most important result is Proposition 7, because it suggests that voluntary 
agreements can be more efficient than an emissions tax, if only under a limited set of 
circumstances. This is an important contribution to the literature, because Dawson and 
Segerson conclude that voluntary agreements with industries can never outperform an 
emissions tax. Adding the enforcement component to the analysis of the formation of 
voluntary agreements, and analyzing issues related to who should enforce these 
agreements and who should bear their enforcement costs, has revealed an avenue 
through which voluntary agreements may outperform emissions taxes. 
 
Toward setting out the conditions under which voluntary agreements can be efficient, 
we discovered that the opportunities for a voluntary agreement to form are limited when 
agreement members are responsible for paying enforcement costs. This is an important 
finding for several reasons. First, it is contrary to Dawson and Segerson’s finding that a 
voluntary agreement can always form to reach a regulator’s environmental target. 
Second, the analysis suggests that weak monitoring capabilities, a low sanction, or a 
stringent environmental target are all possible reasons why a voluntary agreement with 
member-financed enforcement may not be viable. 
 
Moreover, a voluntary agreement is more efficient if its members bear the costs of its 
enforcement. We show that if an agreement with member-financed enforcement does 
form it will have more members than an agreement that does not require member-
financed enforcement. Thus, requiring members to bear the enforcement costs of the 
agreement reduces free riding loss. Shifting these costs to another entity (say the 
government) does not lower total enforcement costs, but does increase the free riding 
loss. Thus, if a voluntary agreement is to be an efficient alternative to an emissions tax, 
the members of the agreement must bear its costs. 
 
We also show that a government regulator should not take on the responsibility of 
enforcing a voluntary agreement or the costs of enforcement: an emissions tax is 
always more efficient than a voluntary agreement that the government enforces, and 
we’ve noted several times that members of an agreement should take on its 
enforcement costs. A voluntary agreement can be more efficient than a tax only if a 
third-party enforces it. We demonstrate one final requirement for a voluntary agreement 
to outperform an emissions tax: the enforcer of the agreement must have a significant 
advantage over the government in terms of its ability to monitor firms’ compliance 
and/or in terms of the sanction it can apply in cases of noncompliance. 
 
We have focused our analysis on how the distribution of enforcement responsibilities 
and enforcement costs affect the efficiency of voluntary agreements with industries, 
without attempting to analyze alternative methods of enforcing these agreements. To 
make our analysis as straightforward as possible, we assumed that the method of 
enforcing agreements is close to what we assume about enforcing emissions taxes. 
Yet, recall from the introduction that there is substantial variation in how existing 
agreements are enforced. One may wonder how our results would hold up if the method 
of enforcing a voluntary agreement was assumed to be different than the method of 
enforcing an emissions tax. For example, we noted that some voluntary agreements in 
Europe are based on the aggregate performance of an industry, monitoring is of 
industry performance, and threatened sanctions are collective punishments in which the 
regulator sanctions all firms if the industry fails to meet its target. 
 
Under this sort of collective enforcement of a voluntary agreement, the principles 
contained in Proposition 7 are likely to hold, with perhaps some modifications. Our work 
suggests that it is always more efficient for members of a voluntary agreement to bear 
its enforcement costs, whatever the enforcement method. Thus, it is important to 
recognize that profitable voluntary agreements with member-financed collective 
enforcement may not exist. Moreover, the existence of profitable agreements will turn 
on the effectiveness of the monitoring technology, the available sanction, and the 
stringency of the government’s environmental target. In contrast to Proposition 7, it may 
be efficient for the government to take on the enforcement of a voluntary agreement, but 
this is only true if it can employ a method of enforcement (i.e., collective enforcement) 
that is different from how it enforces an emissions tax. Finally, it is likely that a voluntary 
agreement with collective enforcement can be an efficient alternative to an emissions 
tax, but only if collective enforcement is substantially cheaper than enforcing an 
emissions tax. It may be a worthwhile endeavor for future research to confirm or 
disprove these assertions. 
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